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Abstract
We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum
finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approxima-
tion, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward function and transition kernel
possess a linear structure. Both the offline and online settings of the problems are considered.
In the offline setting, we control both players and aim to find the Nash Equilibrium byminimiz-
ing the duality gap. In the online setting, we control a single player playing against an arbitrary
opponent and aim to minimize the regret. For both settings, we propose an optimistic variant
of the least-squares minimax value iteration algorithm. We show that our algorithm is compu-
tationally efficient and provably achieves an O˜(
√
d3H3T) upper bound on the duality gap and
regret, where d is the linear dimension, H the horizon and T the total number of timesteps. Our
results do not require additional assumptions on the sampling model.
Our setting requires overcoming several new challenges that are absent in Markov decision
processes or turn-based Markov games. In particular, to achieve optimism with simultaneous
moves, we construct both upper and lower confidence bounds of the value function, and then
compute the optimistic policy by solving a general-sum matrix game with these bounds as the
payoff matrices. As finding the Nash Equilibrium of a general-sum game is computationally
hard, our algorithm instead solves for a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE), which can be
obtained efficiently. To our best knowledge, such a CCE-based scheme for optimism has not
appeared in the literature and might be of interest in its own right.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 2018) is typically modeled as a Markov Decision Pro-
cess (MDP) (Puterman, 2014), where an agent aims to learn the optimal decision-making rule via
interaction with the environment. In Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), several agents
interact with each other and with the underlying environment, and their goal is to optimize their
individual returns. This problem is often formulated under the framework of Markov games
∗Accepted for presentation at the Conference on Learning Theory (COLT) 2020. Emails: qiaomin.xie@cornell.edu,
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(Shapley, 1953), which is a generalization of the MDPmodel. Powered by function approximation
techniques such as deep neural networks (LeCun et al., 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2016), MARL has
recently enjoyed tremendous empirical success across a variety of real-world applications. A par-
tial list of such applications includes the game of Go (Silver et al., 2016, 2017), real-time strategy
games (OpenAI, 2018; Vinyals et al., 2019), Texas Hold’em poker (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown and
Sandholm, 2018, 2019), autonomous driving (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2016), and learning communi-
cation and emergent behaviors (Foerster et al., 2016; Lowe et al., 2017; Bansal et al., 2017; Jaques
et al., 2018; Baker et al., 2019); see the surveys in Busoniu et al. (2008); Zhang et al. (2019).
In contrast to the vibrant empirical study, theoretical understanding of MARL is relatively in-
adequate. Most existing work on Markov games assumes access to either a sampling oracle or a
well-explored behavioral policy, which fails to capture the exploration-exploitation tradeoff that is
fundamental in real-world applications of reinforcement learning. Moreover, these results mostly
focus on the relatively simple turn-based setting. An exception is the work in Wei et al. (2017),
which extends the UCRL2 algorithm (Jaksch et al., 2010) for MDP to zero-sum simultaneous-move
Markov games. However, their approach explicitly estimates the transition model and thus only
works in the tabular setting. Problems with complicated state spaces and transitions necessitate
the use of function approximation architectures. In this regard, a fundamental question is left
open: Can we design a provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithm for Markov games un-
der the function approximation setting?
In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to this question for two-player zero-sum
Markov gameswith simultaneousmoves and a linear structure. In particular, we study an episodic
setting, where each episode consists of H timesteps and the players act simultaneously at each
timestep. Upon reaching the H-th timestep, the episode terminates and players replay the game
again by starting a new episode. Here, the players have no knowledge of the system model (i.e.,
the transition kernel) nor access to a sampling oracle that returns the next state for an arbitrary
state-action pair. Therefore, the players have to learn the system from data by playing the game
sequentially through each episode and repeatedly for multiple episodes. More specifically, we
study episodic Markov games under both the offline and online settings. In the offline setting,
both players are controlled by a central learner, and the goal is to find an approximate Nash Equi-
librium of the game, with the approximation error measured by a notion of duality gap. In the
online setting, we control one of the players and play against an opponent who implements an
arbitrary policy. Our goal is to minimize the total regret, defined as the difference between the
cumulative return of the controlled player and its optimal achievable return when the opponent
plays the best response policy. Both settings are generalizations of the regret minimization prob-
lem for MDPs.
Furthermore, to incorporate function approximation, we consider Markov games with a linear
structure, motivated by the linear MDP model recently studied in Jin et al. (2019). In particular,
we assume that both the transition kernel and the reward admit a d-dimensional linear repre-
sentation with respect to a known feature mapping, which can be potentially nonlinear in its in-
puts. For both the online and offline settings, we propose the first provably efficient reinforcement
learning algorithm without additional assumptions on the sampling model. Our algorithm is an
Optimistic version ofMinimax Value Iteration (OMNI-VI) with least squares estimation—amodel-
free approach—which constructs upper confidence bounds of the optimal action-value function
to promote exploration. We show that the OMNI-VI algorithm is computationally efficient, and it
provably achieves an O˜(
√
d3H3T) regret in the online setting and a similar duality gap guarantee
in the offline setting, where T is the total number of timesteps and O˜ omits logarithmic terms.
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Note that the bounds do not depend on the cardinalities of the state and action spaces, which can
be very large or even infinite. When specialized to MDPs and linear bandits, our results can be
compare with exiting regret bounds and are near-optimal.
We emphasize that the Markov game model poses several new and fundamental challenges
that are absent in MDPs and arise due to subtle game-theoretic considerations. Addressing these
challenges require several new ideas, which we summarize as follows.
1. Optimism via General-Sum Games. In the offline simultaneous-move setting, implement-
ing the optimism principle for both players amounts to constructing both upper and lower
confidence bounds (UCB and LCB) for the optimal value function of the game. Doing so re-
quires one to find, as an algorithmic subroutine, the solution of a general-sum (matrix) game
where the two players’ payoff functions correspond to the upper and lower bounds for the
action-value (or Q) functions of the original Markov game, even though the latter is zero-
sum to begin with. This stands in sharp contrast of turn-based games (Hansen et al., 2013;
Jia et al., 2019; Sidford et al., 2019), in which each turn only involves constructing an UCB
for one player.
2. Using Correlated Equilibrium. Finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) of a general-sum ma-
trix game, however, is computationally hard in general (Daskalakis et al., 2009; Chen et al.,
2009). Our second critical observation is that it suffices to find a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium
(CCE) (Moulin and Vial, 1978; Aumann, 1987) of the game. Originally developed in algo-
rithmic game theory, CCE is a tractable notion of equilibrium that strictly generalizes NE.
In contrast to NE, a CCE can be found efficiently in polynomial time even for general-sum
games (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Blum et al., 2008). Moreover, our analysis
shows that using any CCE of the matrix general-sum game are sufficient for ensuring opti-
mism for the original Markov game. Thus, by using CCE instead of NE, we achieve efficient
exploration-exploitation balance while preserving computational tractability.
3. Concentration and Game Stability. The last challenge is more technical, arising in the analy-
sis of the algorithmwhere we need to establish certain uniform concentration bounds for the
CCEs. As we elaborate later, the CCEs of a general-sum game are unstable (i.e., not Lipschitz)
with respect to the payoff matrices. Therefore, standard approaches for proving uniform
concentration, such as those based on covering/ǫ-net arguments, is fundamentally insuffi-
cient. We overcome this issue by carefully stabilizing the algorithm, for which we make use
of an ǫ-net in the algorithm. Moreover, we show that this can be done in a computationally
efficient way via rounding on-the-fly, without explicitly maintaining the ǫ-net.
We shall discuss the above challenges and ideas in greater details when we formally describe our
algorithms. We note that our regret and duality gap bounds also imply polynomial sample com-
plexity and PAC guarantees for learning the NEs of simultaneous-moveMarkov games. Moreover,
as turn-based games can be viewed as a special case of simultaneous games, where at each state
the reward and transition kernel only depend on the action of one of the players, our algorithms
and guarantees readily apply to the turn-based setting.
1.1 Related Work
There is a large body of literature on applying reinforcement learning methods to Makove games
(a.k.a. stochastic games). These results typically assume access to a sampling oracle, and most of
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them provide convergence guarantees that are asymptotic in nature. In particular, under the tabu-
lar setting, the work in Littman and Szepesvari (1996); Littman (2001a,b); Greenwald et al. (2003);
Hu and Wellman (2003); Grau-Moya et al. (2018) extends the value iteration and Q-learning al-
gorithms (Watkins and Dayan, 1992) to zero-sum and general-sum Markov games, and that in
Perolat et al. (2018); Srinivasan et al. (2018) extends the actor-critic algorithm (Konda and Tsit-
siklis, 2000). Particularly related to us is the work in Sidford et al. (2019), which proposes a
variance-reduced variant of the minimax Q-learning algorithm with near-optimal sample com-
plexity. We note that the theoretical results therein also require a sampling oracle, and they focus
on turn-based games, a special case of simultaneous-move games. The work in Lagoudakis and
Parr (2012); Perolat et al. (2015); Pérolat et al. (2016b,a,c); Yang et al. (2019) considers function ap-
proximation techniques applied to variants of value-iteration methods and establishes finite-time
convergence to the NEs of two-player zero-sum Markov games. Their results are based on the
framework of fitted value-iteration (Munos and Szepesvári, 2008) and the availability of a well-
explored behavioral policy. The recent work Jia et al. (2019) studies turn-based zero-sum Markov
games, where the transition model is assumed to be embedded in some d-dimensional feature
space, extending the MDP model proposed by Yang and Wang (2019b). Assuming a sampling
oracle, they propose a variant of Q-learning algorithm that is guaranteed to find an ε-optimal
strategy using O˜(dε−2(1 − γ)−4) samples, where γ is a discount factor. In summary, all of the
work above either assume a sampling oracle or a well explored behavioral policy for drawing
transitions, therefore effectively bypassing the exploration issue.
Our work builds on a line of research on provably efficient methods for MDPs without addi-
tional assumptions on the sampling model. Most of the existing work focus on the tabular setting;
see e.g., Strehl et al. (2006); Jaksch et al. (2010); Osband et al. (2014); Azar et al. (2017); Dann et al.
(2017); Agrawal and Jia (2017); Jin et al. (2018); Russo (2019); Rosenberg and Mansour (2019); Jin
and Luo (2019); Zanette and Brunskill (2019); Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019); Dong et al. (2019b)
and the references therein. Under the function approximation setting, sample-efficient algorithms
have been proposed using linear function approximators (Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2019a,b; Yang
and Wang, 2019a; Du et al., 2019b; Wang et al., 2019), as well as nonlinear ones (Wen and Van Roy,
2017; Jiang et al., 2017; Dann et al., 2018; Du et al., 2019b; Dong et al., 2019a; Du et al., 2019a).
Among this line of work, our paper is most related to Jin et al. (2019); Zanette et al. (2019); Cai
et al. (2019), which consider linear MDP models and propose optimistic and randomized variants
of least-squares value iteration (LSVI) (Bradtke and Barto, 1996; Osband et al., 2014) as well as op-
timistic variants of proximal policy optimization (Schulman et al., 2017). Our linear Markov game
model generalizes the MDP model considered in these papers, and our OMNI-VI algorithm can
be viewed as a generalization of the optimistic LSVI method proposed in (Jin et al., 2019). As men-
tioned before, the game structures in our problem pose fundamental challenges that are absent in
MDPs, and thus their algorithms cannot be trivially extended to our game setting.
Work on provably sample efficient RL methods for Markov games is quite scarce. The only
comparable work we are aware of is Wei et al. (2017), which proposes a model-based algorithm
that extends the UCRL2 algorithm (Jaksch et al., 2010) for tabular MDPs to the game setting. Sim-
ilarly to their work, we also consider both the online and offline settings and provide guarantees
in terms of duality gap and regret. On the other hand, they only consider tabular setting, a special
case of our linear model. Moreover, their model-based algorithm explicitly estimates the Markov
transition kernel and relies on the complicated technique of Extended Value Iteration, whose com-
putational cost is quite high as it requires augmenting the state/action spaces. In comparison, our
algorithm is model-free in the sense that it directly estimates the value functions; moreover, the
computational cost of our algorithm only depends on the dimension d of the feature and not the
cardinality of the state space.
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Finally, we remark that there is a line of work on robustMDPs (Xu andMannor, 2012; Lim et al.,
2013), where an adversary chooses the transition kernel from an uncertainty set. This problem is
closely related to our online setting, where the adversary chooses an action that determines the
transition kernel. One technical difference is that in their setting, the uncertainty set is known yet
the choice of the adversary is not directly observable, whereas in our case the adversary’s action is
observed but its influence on the transition and value functions needs to be estimated from data.
The algorithms are also different: they take an model-based approach that finds the worst-case
transition kernel from the uncertainty set, whereas our algorithm computes empirical estimates of
the worst-case value functions using data. Also, their results apply only to the tabular setting of
MDPs.
2 Background and Preliminaries
In this section, we formally describe the setup for episodic two-player zero-sum Markov games
with simultaneous moves. We then describe the setting for turn-based games, which can be
viewed as a special case of simultaneous-moves games.
2.1 Notation
For two quantities x and y that potentially depend on the problem parameters (d,H, |A|, T, etc.), if
x ≥ Cy holds for a universal absolute constant C > 0, wewrite x & y, x = Ω(y) and y = O(x). For
each real number u, define the clipping operation ΠH(u) = max {min {u,H} ,−H}. We use ‖ · ‖
to denote the vector ℓ2 norm and ‖ · ‖F the matrix Frobenius norm. Given a positive semidefinite
matrix A, define the weighted ℓ2 norm ‖v‖A :=
√
v⊤Av for the vector v.
We sometimes need to consider a general-summatrix (or normal form) game with payoff matri-
ces ui ∈ R|A|×|A|, i ∈ {1, 2} for two players denoted by P1 and P2. If P1 and P2 take actions a and
b, respectively, then Pi receives a payoff ui(a, b). We use the convention that P1 tries to maximize
the payoff and P2 tries to minimize. A joint distribution σ ∈ ∆(A ×A) of both players’ actions
is called a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (Moulin and Vial, 1978; Aumann, 1987) of the game if it
satisfies
E(a,b)∼σ [u1(x, a, b)] ≥ Eb∼P2σ
[
u1(x, a′, b)
]
, ∀a′ ∈ A, (1a)
E(a,b)∼σ [u2(x, a, b)] ≤ Ea∼P1σ
[
u2(x, a, b′)
]
, ∀b′ ∈ A, (1b)
where for i ∈ {1, 2}, Piσ ∈ ∆(A) denotes the i-th marginal of σ. In words, in a CCE the players
choose their actions in a potentially correlated way such that no unilateral (unconditional) devia-
tion from σ is beneficial.1 Note that a CCE σ = σ1 × σ2 in product form is an NE.
2.2 Simultaneous-Move Markov Games
A two-player, zero-sum, simultaneous-moves, episodic Markov game is defined by the tuple
(S ,A1,A2, r,P,H),
where S is the state space, Ai is a finite set of actions that player i ∈ {1, 2} can take, r is reward
function, P is transition kernel and H is the number of steps in each episode. At each step h ∈
1We note in passing that there is a more restrictive notion of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) (Moulin and Vial, 1978;
Aumann, 1987), in which the deviation is allowed to depend on the original actions. The set of CCEs include the set of
CEs, which in turn includes the set of NEs. We use CCE in this paper as it is the easiest to compute among the three.
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[H], upon observing the state x ∈ S , P1 and P2 take actions a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2, respectively,
and then both receive the reward rh(x, a, b). The system then transitions to a new state x′ ∼
Ph(·|x, a, b) according to the transition kernel. Throughout this paper, we assume for simplicity
that A1 = A2 = A and that the rewards rh(x, a, b) are deterministic functions of the tuple (x, a, b)
taking value in [−1, 1]; generalization to the setting with A1 6= A2 and stochastic rewards is
straightforward.
Denote by ∆ ≡ ∆(A) the probability simplex over the action spaceA. A stochastic policy of P1
is a length-H sequence of functions π := (πh : S → ∆)h∈[H]. At each step h ∈ [H] and state x ∈ S ,
P1 takes an action sampled from the distribution πh(x) overA. Similarly, a stochastic policy of P2
is given by the sequence ν := (νh : S → ∆)h∈[H].
2.2.1 Value Functions
For a fixed pair of policies (π, ν) for both players, the value and Q (a.k.a. action-value) functions
for the above game can be defined in a manner analogous to the episodicMarkov decision process
(MDP) setting:
Vπ,νh (x) := E
[ H
∑
t=h
rt(xt, at, bt)|xh = x
]
, Qπ,νh (x, a, b) := E
[ H
∑
t=h
rt(xt, at, bt)|xh = x, ah = a, bh = b
]
,
where the expectation is over at ∼ πt(xt), bt ∼ νt(xt) and xt+1 ∼ Pt(·|xt, at, bt). It is convenient to
set Vπ,νH+1(x) ≡ Qπ,νH+1(x) ≡ 0 for the terminal reward. Under the boundedness assumption on the
reward, it is easy see that all value functions are bounded:∣∣Vπ,νh (x)∣∣ ≤ H and ∣∣Qπ,νh (x, a, b)∣∣ ≤ H, ∀x, a, b, h,π, ν.
In the zero-sum setting, for a given initial state x1, P1 aims to maximize V
π,ν
1 (x1) whereas P2
aims to minimize it. Accordingly, we introduce the value and Q functions when P1 plays the best
response to a fixed policy ν of P2:
V∗,νh (x) = maxπ V
π,ν
h (x) and Q
∗,ν
h (x, a, b) = maxπ
Qπ,νh (x, a, b).
Analogously, when P2 plays the best response to P1’s policy π, we define
Vπ,∗h (x) = minν V
π,ν
h (x) and Q
π,∗
h (x, a, b) = minν
Qπ,νh (x, a, b).
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game is a pair of stochastic policies (π∗, ν∗) that are the best
response to each other; that is,
Vπ
∗,ν∗
1 (x1) = V
∗,ν∗
1 (x1) = V
π∗,∗
1 (x1), x1 ∈ S . (2)
We assume that the game satisfies appropriate regularity conditions so that an NE exists and their
value is unique.2 Correspondingly, let V∗h (x) := V
π∗,ν∗
h (x) and Q
∗
h(x, a, b) := Q
π∗,ν∗
h (x, a, b) denote
the values of the NE at step h.
Define the following shorthand for conditional expectation for the step-h transition:
[PhV](x, a, b) := Ex′∼Ph(·|x,a,b)[V(x
′)] =
∫
V(x′)dPh(x′|x, a, b).
2This holds, e.g., when the state space is compact (Maitra and Parthasarathy, 1970, 1971).
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While not explicitly needed in our analysis, we note that the value/Q functions for the NE satisfy
the Bellman equations
Q∗h(x, a, b) = rh(x, a, b) + (PhV
∗
h+1)(x, a, b), (3a)
and V∗h (x) = max
A∈∆
min
B∈∆
Ea∼A,b∼BQ∗h(x, a, b) = min
B∈∆
max
A∈∆
Ea∼A,b∼BQ∗h(x, a, b). (3b)
The fixed-policy and best-response value/Q functions, Vπ,νh ,V
π,∗
h ,V
∗,ν
h ,Q
π,ν
h ,Q
π,∗
h and Q
∗,ν
h , satisfy
a similar set of Bellman equations; we omit the details.
The following weak duality result, which follows immediately from definition, relates the
above value and Q functions.
Proposition 1 (Weak Duality). For each policy pair (π, ν) and each h ∈ [H], (x, a, b) ∈ S ×A×A, we
have
Qπ,∗h (x, a, b) ≤Q∗h(x, a, b) ≤ Q∗,νh (x, a, b), Vπ,∗h (x) ≤V∗h (x) ≤ V∗,νh (x),
Qπ,∗h (x, a, b) ≤Qπ,νh (x, a, b) ≤ Q∗,νh (x, a, b), Vπ,∗h (x) ≤Vπ,νh (x) ≤ V∗,νh (x).
2.2.2 Linear Structures
We assume that both the reward function and transition kernel have a linear structure.
Assumption 1 (Linearity and Boundedness). For each (x, a, b) ∈ S ×A×A and h ∈ [H], we have
rh(x, a, b) = φ(x, a, b)
⊤θh and Ph(·|x, a, b) = φ(x, a, b)⊤µh(·),
where φ : S ×A×A → Rd is a known feature map, θh ∈ Rd is an unknown vector and µh =
(
µ
(i)
h
)
i∈[d]
is a vector of d unknown (signed) measures on S . We assume that ‖φ(·, ·, ·)‖ ≤ 1, ‖θh‖ ≤
√
d and
‖µh(S)‖ ≤
√
d for all h ∈ [H], where ‖ · ‖ is the vector ℓ2 norm.
Note that boundedness of the linear weights θh and µh allows for certain covering and con-
centration arguments in the analysis; also see (Jin et al., 2019, Section 2.1) for a discussion on the
specific choice of normalization above. It is also easy to see that the linearity assumption above
implies that the Q functions are linear.
Lemma 1 (Linearity of Value Function). Under Assumption 1, for any policy pair (π, ν) and any h ∈
[H], there exists a vector wπ,νh ∈ Rd such that
Qπ,νh (x, a, b) =
〈
φ(x, a, b),wπ,νh
〉
, ∀(x, a, b) ∈ S ×A×A.
Proof. By Bellman equation and linearity of rh and Ph, we have
Qπ,νh (x, a, b) = rh(x, a, b) + PhV
π,ν
h+1(x, a, b) = φ(x, a, b)
⊤θh +
∫
Vπ,νh+1(x
′)φ(x, a, b)⊤dµh(x′).
Letting wπ,νh := θh +
∫
Vπ,νh+1(x
′)dµh(x′) proves the lemma.
Remark 1. Since Qπ,∗h (x, a, b) = Q
π,br(π)
h (x, a, b), where br(π) ∈ argminν Qπ,νh (x, a, b) is the best
response policy to π, it follows immediately from Lemma 1 that Qπ,∗h (x, a, b) =
〈
φ(x, a, b),wπ,∗h
〉
for some wπ,∗h ∈ Rd. Similarly, we have Q∗,νh (x, a, b) =
〈
φ(x, a, b),w∗,νh
〉
for some w∗,νh ∈ Rd.
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The linear setting above covers the tabular setting as a special case, where d = |S| · |A|2 and
φ(x, a, b) is the indicator vector for the tuple (x, a, b). It is also clear that MDPs are a special case
of Markov games when P2 plays a fixed and known policy. In particular, our setting covers both
tabular MDPs as well as the linear MDP setting considered in the work Jin et al. (2019). Finally, as
we elaborate in Section 2.3 to follow, turn-based Markov Games can also be viewed as a special
case of our setting.
Remark 2. Linearity of the reward and transition kernel is a strictly stronger assumption than lin-
earity of the value functions. Our analysis makes crucial use of this stronger assumption, which
ensures that the linearity of value functions is preserved under the Bellman equation. In fact, it
is likely that this assumption is essential for developing efficient algorithms, in view of recent
hardness result in Du et al. (2020) that only assumes near-linearity of value functions of MDPs (a
special case of Markov games).
2.3 Turn-Based Markov games
In turn-based games, at each state only one player takes an action. Without loss of generality, we
may partition the state space as S = S1 ∪ S2, where Si are the states at which it is player i’s turn
to play.3 For each state x ∈ S , let I(x) ∈ {1, 2} indicate the current player to play, so that x ∈ SI(x).
At each step h ∈ [H], player I(x) observes the current state x and takes an action a; then the two
players receive the reward rh(x, a), and the system transitions to a new state x′ ∼ Ph(·|x, a).
The value/Q functions Vπ,νh (x),Q
π,ν
h (x, a) etc., as well as the corresponding NE of the game,
can be defined in a completely analogous way as in the simultaneous-move setting. Similarly to
Assumption 1, we also assume that the game has a linear structure.
Assumption 2 (Linearity and Boundedness, Turn-Based). For each (x, a) ∈ S × A and h ∈ [H], we
have
rh(x, a) = φ(x, a)
⊤θh and Ph(·|x, a) = φ(x, a)⊤µh(·),
where φ : S × A → Rd is a known feature map, θh ∈ Rd is an unknown vector and {µ(i)h }i∈[d] are d
unknown (signed) measures on S . We assume that ‖φ(·, ·)‖ ≤ 1, ‖µh(S)‖ ≤
√
d and ‖θh‖ ≤
√
d for all
h ∈ [H].
One may view a turn-based game as a special case of a simultaneous-move game, where at
each state only one of the players is “active” and the other player’s action has no influence on
the reward or the transition. Formally, for each x ∈ S1, the values of rh(x, a, b), Ph(·|x, a, b) and
φ(x, a, b) are independent of b; for each x ∈ S2, they are independent of a.
3 Main Results for the Offline Setting
In this section, we consider the offline setting, where a central controller controls both players. The
goal of the controller is learn a Nash equilibrium (π∗, ν∗) of the game in episodic setting. In what
follows, we formally define the problem setup and objectives, and then present our algorithm and
provide theoretic guarantees for its performance.
3The assumption S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ is satisfied if one incorporates the “turn” of the player as part of the state.
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3.1 Setup and Performance Metrics
In the episodic setting, the Markov game is played for K episodes, each of which consists of H
timesteps. At the beginning of the k-th episode, an arbitrary initial state xk1 is chosen. Then the
players P1 and P2 play according to the policies πk = (πkh)h∈[H] and ν
k = (νkh)h∈[H], respectively,
which may adapt to observations from past episodes. The game terminates after H timesteps and
restarts for the (k+ 1)-th episode. Note that expected reward for P1 and P2 in the k-th episode is
Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1).
Duality gap guarantees: Recall the weak duality property in Proposition 1, which states the
value of the NE, V∗1 (x1), is sandwiched between V
πk,∗
1 (x1) and V
∗,νk
1 (x1). Therefore, it is natural
to use the duality gap V∗,ν
k
1 (x1) − Vπ
k,∗
1 (x1) to measure how well the policy (π
k, νk) in the k-th
episode approximates the NE. Accordingly, we aim to bound the following total duality gap:
Gap(K) :=
K
∑
k=1
[
V∗,ν
k
1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,∗
1 (x
k
1)
]
. (4)
Another way to interpret the above objective is as follows. Define the exploitability (Davis et al.,
2014) of P1 and P2, respectively, as
Exploit1(π
k, νk) := Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,∗
1 (x
k
1) and Exploit2(π
k, νk) := V∗,ν
k
1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1),
both of which are nonnegative by Proposition 1. Here Exploiti(π
k, νk) measures the potential loss
of player i ∈ {1, 2} in the k-th episode if the other player unilaterally switched to the best response
policy. The total duality gap can then be rewritten as
Gap(K) =
K
∑
k=1
[
Exploit1(π
k, νk) + Exploit2(π
k, νk)
]
,
which is the sum of the exploitability of both players accumulated over K episodes. Also note that
in special cases of MDPs, Gap(K) reduces to the usual notion of total regret.
Sample complexity and PAC guarantees: Another performancemetric is the sample complexity
for finding an approximate NE. In particular, suppose that for all episodes the initial states x1 are
sampled from the same fixed distribution. We are interested in the number of episodes K (or
equivalently the number of samples T = KH) needed to find a policy pair (π, ν) satisfying
V∗,ν1 (x1)−Vπ,∗1 (x1) ≤ ǫ with probability at least 1− δ.
In light of Proposition 1, the above inequality implies that (π, ν) is an ǫ-approximate NE in the
sense that
V∗,ν1 (x1)− ǫ ≤ Vπ,ν1 (x1) ≤ Vπ,∗1 (x1) + ǫ;
that is, (π, ν) satisfies the definition (2) of NE up to an ǫ error. As we discuss in details after
presenting our main theorem, a bound on the total duality gap implies a bound on the sample
complexity. Such a bound in turn implies a PAC-type guarantee in the sense of Kakade (Kakade,
2003), which stipulates that an ǫ-approximate NE is played in all but a small number of timesteps.
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Algorithm 1 Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration (Simultaneous Move, Offline)
1: Input: bonus parameter β > 0.
2: for episode k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
3: Receive initial state xk1
4: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 2, 1 do ⊲ update policy
5: Λkh ← ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)⊤ + I.
6: wkh ← (Λkh)−1 ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)
]
.
7: wkh ← (Λkh)−1 ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)
]
.
8: Q
k
h(·, ·, ·) ← ΠH
{
(wkh)
⊤φ(·, ·, ·) + β
√
φ(·, ·, ·)⊤(Λkh)−1φ(·, ·, ·)
}
.
9: Qk
h
(·, ·, ·) ← ΠH
{
(wkh)
⊤φ(·, ·, ·)− β
√
φ(·, ·, ·)⊤(Λkh)−1φ(·, ·, ·)
}
.
10: For each x, let σkh(x)← FIND_CCE
(
Q
k
h,Q
k
h
, x
)
.
11: V
k
h(x) ← E(a,b)∼σkh(x)Q
k
h(x, a, b) for each x.
12: Vkh(x) ← E(a,b)∼σkh(x)Q
k
h
(x, a, b) for each x.
13: end for
14: for step h = 1, 2, . . . ,H do ⊲ execute policy
15: Sample (akh, b
k
h) ∼ σkh(xkh).
16: P1 takes action akh; P2 takes action b
k
h.
17: Observe next state xkh+1.
18: end for
19: end for
3.2 Algorithm
We now present our algorithm, Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration (OMNI-VI) with least squares
estimation, which is given as Algorithm 1.
In each episode k, the algorithm first constructs the policies for both players (lines 4–13), and
then executes the policy to play the game (lines 14–18). The construction of the policy is done
through backward induction with respect to the timestep h. In each timestep, we first compute
upper/lower estimates wh,wh ∈ Rd of the linear coefficients of the Q-function. This is done by
approximately solving the Bellman equation (3) using (regularized) least-squares estimation, for
which we use empirical data from the previous k − 1 episodes to estimate the unknown tran-
sition kernel Ph (lines 5–7). Then, to encourage exploration, we construct UCB/LCB for the
Q function by adding/subtracting an appropriate bonus term (lines 8–9). The bonus takes the
form β
√
φ⊤(Λkh)−1φ, where Λ
k
h is the regularized Gram matrix defined in line 5 of the algorithm.
This form of bonus is common in the literature of linear bandits (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018).
The next and crucial step is to convert the UCB/LCB (Qh,Qh) for the Q function into UCB/LCB
(Vh,Vh) for the value function (lines 10–12). This step turns out to be quite delicate; we elaborate
below.
Note that Vh(x) and Vh(x) should correspond to the actions (a
′, b′) that would be actually
played at state x, that is, Vh(x) = Qh(x, a
′, b′) (in expectation w.r.t. randomness of the stochastic
policy; similarly forVh(x)), so that these upper/lower bounds can be tightened up using empirical
observations from these actions. To construct these bounds, one may be tempted to let each player
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independently compute the maximin or minimax values and actions. That is, one may let P1 play
the action a′ = argmaxaminb Q
k
h(x, a, b) and P2 play b
′ = argminbmaxa Qkh(x, a, b), and then set
V
k
h(x) ← Qkh(x, a′, b′) and Vkh(x) ← Qkh(x, a′, b′). Unfortunately, such a V
k
h(x) is not a valid upper
bound for the true value, since Q
k
h 6= Qkh in general and hence Q
k
h(x, a
′, b′) 6= maxaminb Qkh(x, a, b).
Instead, we must coordinate both players for their choices of actions, which is done by solving
the general-sum matrix game with payoff matrices Q
k
h(x, ·, ·) and Qkh(x, ·, ·). Finding the NE for
general-sumgames gives valid UCB/LCB, but doing so is computationally intractable (Daskalakis
et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009). Fortunately, computing an (approximate) CCE of the matrix game
turns out to be sufficient as well. For technical reasons elaborated in the next subsection, the
subroutine FIND_CCE for finding the CCE is implemented in a specific way as follows. Let Q be
the class of functions Q : S ×A×A → R with the parametric form
Q(x, a, b) = ΠH
{
〈w, φ(x, a, b)〉+ ρβ
√
φ(x, a, b)⊤Aφ(x, a, b)
}
, (5)
where the parameters (w, A, ρ) ∈ Rd×Rd×d×{±1} satisfy ‖w‖ ≤ 2H√dk and ‖A‖F ≤ β2
√
d. Let
Qǫ be a fixed ǫ-covering ofQwith respect to the ℓ∞ norm ‖Q− Q′‖∞ := supx,a,b |Q(x, a, b)− Q′(x, a, b)|.
With these notations, we present the subroutine FIND_CCE in Algorithm 2. The algorithm effec-
tively “rounds” the game
(
Q
k
h(x, ·, ·),Qkh(x, ·, ·)
)
of interest into a nearby game in the finite ǫ-cover
Qǫ × Qǫ, and then uses the CCE of the latter game as an surrogate of the CCE of the original
game. We remark that this rounding step can be implemented efficiently without explicitly com-
puting/maintaining the (exponentially large) ǫ-net; see Appendix D for details.
Algorithm 2 FIND_CCE
1: Input: Q
k
h, Q
k
h
, x and discretization parameter ǫ > 0.
2: Pick a pair
(
Q˜,Q˜
)
in Qǫ ×Qǫ satisfying
∥∥∥Q˜−Qkh∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ and
∥∥∥Q˜ − Qkh
∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ.
3: For the input x, let σ˜(x) be the CCE (cf. equation (1)) of the matrix game with payoff matrices
Q˜(x, ·, ·) for P1 and Q˜ (x, ·, ·) for P2.
4: Output: σ˜(x).
3.2.1 Technical Considerations for FIND_CCE
We explain the motivation for using rounding and an ǫ-cover in FIND_CCE. First, note that the
least-squares step of Algorithm 1 (line 5–7) uses data from all previous episodes. This introduces
complicated probabilistic dependency between the estimation target V
k
h+1 and the linear features
φ(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h), τ ∈ [k − 1], as they both depend on past data. Such dependency is not present in
the usual least-squares estimation in supervised learning. To overcome this issue, a standard
approach is to use a covering argument to establish uniform concentration bounds valid for all
value functions V
k
h+1.
4
4In the tabular setting, recent work in Agarwal et al. (2019); Ding and Chen (2020); Pananjady and Wainwright
(2019) bypasses the use of uniform concentration by employing sophisticated leave-one-out techniques to decouple the
probabilistic dependency. However, it is unclear how such techniques can be used in the function approximation
setting.
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While it is straightforward to construct a cover for the Q functions (as we have done in FIND_CCE),
doing so for the value functions is challenging due to instability of the equilibria of general-sum
games. In particular, recall that the value function is defined by the CCE value of a general-sum
game with two payoff matrices given by the Q functions. The CCE value, however, is not a Lip-
schitz function of the payoff matrices, hence a cover for the former does not follow from a cover
for the latter. Indeed, suppose that a game has payoff matrices (Q
k
h,Q
k
h
) that are ǫ-close to another
game (Q˜,Q˜ ) from the cover Qǫ ×Qǫ. Lemma 19 in Appendix E shows the following:
(i) The CCE values of the above two games may be 1+ ǫ away from each other.
Interestingly, general-summatrix games satisfy another property, proved in Lemma 4, that is seem-
ingly contradictory to property (i) above:
(ii) The CCE policy of the game (Q˜,Q˜ ) from the cover is a 2ǫ-approximate CCE policy for the
original game (Q
k
h,Q
k
h
), and vice versa.
Here a 2ǫ-approximate CCE policy is one that satisfies the definition (1) of CCE with an additive
2ǫ error on the RHS. The proof of Lemma 19 gives an example in which properties (i) and (ii) hold
simultaneously.
Due to property (i) above, it is unclear how to run a covering argument only in the analysis,
since in this case the algorithm would use the CCE value of the original game (Q
k
h,Q
k
h
) and this
value cannot be controlled. However, thanks to property (ii), it suffices to use the ǫ-cover in the
algorithm, since in this case the algorithm actually uses the CCE policy of the game (Q˜,Q˜ ) fromthe finite ǫ-cover, and its value can be controlled by a union bound over the cover. The small
price we pay is that the resulting UCB/LCB are valid up to an 2ǫ error, which eventually goes
into the regret bound. This error can be made negligible relative to the main terms in the regret by
choosing a small enough ǫ.
In summary, the above algorithmic use of ǫ-cover appears crucial under our current frame-
work. We leave as an intriguing open problem whether this algorithmic complication is in fact
necessary or can be avoided by a more clever analysis. We also remark that the above issue does
not exist in the tabular setting, in which case the value functions (V
k
h,V
k
h) are just a pair of finite-
dimensional vectors and hence one can directly build an ǫ-cover for the relevant set of vectors.
3.3 Theoretical Guarantees
In each episode k, Algorithm 2 computes a joint (correlated) policy σkh . As NE requires the policies
to be in product form, wemarginalize σkh into a pair of independent policies π
k
h(x) := P1σkh(x) and
νkh(x) := P2σkh(x) for each player. Our main theoretical result is the following bound on the total
duality gap (4) of these policy pairs. Recall that T = KH is the total number of timesteps.
Theorem 1 (Offline, Simultaneous Moves). Under Assumption 1, there exists a constant c > 0 such
that the following holds for each fixed p ∈ (0, 1). Set β = cdH√ι with ι := log(2dT/p) in Algorithm 1,
and set ǫ = 1KH in Algorithm 2. Then with probability at least 1− p, Algorithm 1 satisfies the bounds
V∗,ν
k
1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,∗
1 (x
k
1) ≤ Vk1(xk1)−Vk1(xk1) +
8
K
, ∀k ∈ [K] (6)
K
∑
k=1
[
V
k
1(x
k
1)−Vk1(xk1)
]
.
√
d3H3Tι2; (7)
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consequently, we have
Gap(K) .
√
d3H3Tι2. (8)
The proof is given in Section 5. Below we provide discussion and remarks on this theorem.
Optimality of the bound: The theorem provides an (instance-independent) bound scaling with√
T. As the total duality gap reduces to the usual notion of regret in the special case MDPs,
our bound is optimal in T in view of known minimax lower bounds for MDPs (Lattimore and
Szepesvári, 2018). Also note that our bound is independent of the cardinality |S| and |A| of the
state/action spaces, but rather depends only on dimension d of the feature space, thanks to the
use of function approximation. To investigate the tightness of the dependence of our bound on d
and H, we recall that our setting covers the standard tabular MDPs and linear bandits as special
cases. A direct reduction from the known lower bounds on tabular MDPs gives a lower bound
Ω(
√
dH2T) for the case of nonstationary transitions (Jin et al., 2018; Azar et al., 2017). Our bound
is off by a factor of
√
H, which may be improved by using a “Bernstein-type” bonus term (Azar
et al., 2017; Jin et al., 2018). Results from linear bandits give the lower bound Ω(
√
d2T). The addi-
tional
√
d factor in our bound is due to a covering argument applied to the d-dimensional feature
space for establishing uniform concentration bounds.
Computational complexity: Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently, with computational
and memory complexities polynomial in H,K, d and |A|. In particular, note that a CCE of a
general-sumgame can be found in polynomial time (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Blum
et al., 2008).5 Moreover, in Algorithm 1 we do not need to compute Q(x, ·, ·),V(x) and σ˜(x) etc. for
all x ∈ S ; rather, we only need to do so for the states {xkh} actually encountered in the algorithm.
Similarly, we do not need to explicitly compute or store the ǫ-net Qǫ in FIND_CCE (Algorithm 2).
It suffices if we can find an element in Qǫ that is ǫ-close to a given function in Q, which can
be done efficiently on the fly. Indeed, each function in Q has a succinct representation using
(w, A) ∈ Rd × Rd×d. We can (implicitly) maintain a covering of the space of (w, A), and find a
nearby element from this covering when needed, which can be done inO(d2) time via coordinate-
wise rounding. See Appendix D and Lemma 18 therein for details.
Sample complexity and PAC guarantees: The regret bound in Theorem 1 can be converted into
a bound on the sample complexity. For simplicity we assume that the initial state x1 is fixed; for
the general case where x1 is sampled from a fixed distribution, we can simply add an additional
time step at the beginning of each episode. After K episodes, we choose, among the K policy pairs
(πk, νk), k ∈ [K] computed by Algorithm 1, the pair (πk0 , νk0) with the minimum gap between the
UCB and LCB; that is,
k0 = arg min
k∈[K]
{
V
k
1(x1)−Vk1(x1)
}
.
5This can be done by linear programming—as the inequalities in the definition (1) of CCE are linear in σ—or by
self-playing a no-regret algorithm (Blum et al., 2008).
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Note that the UCB/LCB, V
k
1(x1) and V
k
1(x1), are computed by the algorithm and hence their val-
ues are known. This policy pair (πk0 , νk0) satisfies the bound
V∗,ν
k0
1 (x1)−Vπ
k0 ,∗
1 (x1)
≤ Vk01 (x1)−Vk01 (x1) +
8
K
inequality (6)
≤ 1
K
K
∑
k=1
[
V
k
1(x1)−Vk1(x1)
]
+
8
K
min ≤ average
.
√
d3H5ι2
T
. inequality (7) divided by K = T/H
Therefore, we can find an ǫ-approximate NE (meaning that the last RHS is bounded by ǫ) with
a sample complexity of T = O
(
d3H5ι2
ǫ2
)
. By playing the policy pair (πk0 , νk0) in all subsequent
episodes, we obtain a PAC-type guarantee Kakade (2003) in the sense that an ǫ-approximate NE
is played in all but O
(
d3H5ι2
ǫ2
)
timesteps.
3.4 Turn-Based Games
In this section, we consider turn-based Markov games, which is a special case of simultaneous-
moveMarkov games. Algorithm 1 can be specialized to this setting. For completeness, we provide
the resulting algorithm in Algorithm 4 in Appendix A.1. Note that for turn-based games, the
FIND_CCE routine is simplified to the subroutines FIND_MAX and FIND_MIN given in Algorithm 5,
because each state is controlled by a single player and hence finding a CCE reduces to computing
a maximizer or minimizer.
As a corollary of Theorem 1, we have the following bound on the total duality gap, which is
defined in the same way as in equation (4).
Corollary 1 (Offline, Turn-based). Under Assumption 2, there exists a constant c > 0 such that, for each
fixed p ∈ (0, 1), by setting β = cdH√ι with ι := log(2dT/p) in Algorithm 4, then with probability at
least 1− p, Algorithm 4 satisfies bound
Gap(K) .
√
d3H3Tι2.
We prove this corollary in Appendix A.1.1.
4 Main Results for the Online Setting
In this section, we consider the online setting, where we control P1 and play against an arbitrary
(and potentially adversarial) P2. Our goal is to maximize the reward of P1. Belowwe describe the
performance metrics, followed by our algorithms and theoretical guarantees.
4.1 Setup and Performance Metrics
We consider the episodic setting as described in Section 3.1. Let π = (πk) and ν = (νk) be the
policy sequences for P1 and P2, respectively, where ν is arbitrary. We do not know P2’s choice of
ν nor the Markov model of the game a priori, and would like learn a good policy π online so as
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to optimize the reward ∑k V
πk,νk
1 received by P1 over K episodes. To this end, we are interested in
bounding, for each ν, the total (expected) regret
Regretν(K) :=
K
∑
k=1
[
V∗1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1)
]
, (9)
where xk1 is the (arbitrary) initial state in the k-th episode. If we can obtain a bound on Regretν(K)
that scales sublinearly with K for all ν, then we are guaranteed that regardless of ν, the reward
collected by P1 is no worse (in the long run) than its optimal worst-case reward, that is, the NE
value V∗1 .
We note that a special case of the above setting is when P2 is omniscient and always plays the
best response to P1’s policy, i.e.,
νk = br(πk) ∈ argmin
ν′∈∆
Vπ
k,ν′
1 (x
k
1), ∀k ∈ [K].
Note that in this case, we have Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1) = V
πk,∗
1 (x
k
1) by definition.
4.2 Algorithm
We adapt the Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration algorithm to the online setting, as given in Al-
gorithm 3. This algorithm can be viewed as a one-sided version of Algorithm 1: we compute
least-squares estimate for the linear coefficients and then construct UCBs for the value functions—
we do not need to construct LCBs as P2 is not controlled by us. Constructing the UCBs is done by
finding the NE of the zero-sum matrix game with the payoff matrix Qkh(x, ·, ·).
Algorithm 3 Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration (Simultaneous Move, Online)
1: Input: bonus parameter β > 0.
2: for episode k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
3: Receive initial state xk1.
4: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 2, 1 do ⊲ update policy
5: Λkh ← ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)⊤ + I.
6: wkh ← (Λkh)−1 ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)
]
.
7: Qkh(·, ·, ·) ← ΠH
{
(wkh)
⊤φ(·, ·, ·) + β
√
φ(·, ·, ·)⊤(Λkh)−1φ(·, ·, ·)
}
.
8: For each x, let (πkh(x), B0) be the NE of the matrix game with payoff matrix Q
k
h(x, ·, ·).
9: Vkh (·)← Ea∼πkh(·),b∼B0
[
Qkh(·, a, b)
]
.
10: end for
11: for step h = 1, 2, . . . ,H do ⊲ execute policy
12: P1 take action akh ∼ πkh(xkh).
13: Let P2 play; denote its action by bkh.
14: Observe next state xkh+1.
15: end for
16: end for
Due to the one-sided nature of the online setting, some of the difficulties in the offline setting—
pertaining to general-sum games and CCE—no longer exist here. In particular, Algorithm 3 no
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longer requires the FIND_CCE subroutine that makes use of an ǫ-cover. Technically, this is due to
the fact that zero-summatrix games are more well-behaved than general-sum games. In particular,
the value of a zero-sum game is Lipschitz in the payoff matrix, hence uniform concentration can
be established in a more straightforward manner (cf. the discussion in Section 3.2).
4.3 Regret Bound Guarantees
We establish the following bound on the total regret (9) achieved by Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2 (Online, Simultaneous Move). Under Assumption 1, there exists a constant c > 0 such
that the following holds for each fixed p ∈ (0, 1) and any policy sequence ν for P2. Set β = cdH√ι with
ι := log(2dT/p). Then with probability at least 1− p, Algorithm 3 achieves the regret bound
Regretν(K) .
√
d3H3Tι2.
The proof is given in Appendix C. Note that the regret bound holds for any policy ν of P2 and
any initial states {xk1}. Moreover, the bound is sublinear in T—scaling with
√
T in particular—
and depends polynomially on d and H. As our regret reduces to the standard regret notion in the
special cases of MDPs and linear bandits, the discussion in Section 3.2 on the optimality of bounds,
also applies here.
We remark that the above bound provides a uniform guarantee for P1’s performance, regard-
less of the policy of the opponent P2. An interesting future direction is to achieve a more refined
guarantee that exploits a weak opponent. In particular, such a guarantee would involve a stronger
notion of regret in which, instead of competing with the Nash value ∑k V
∗
1 (x
k
1) as in the current
definition (9), one competes against the value maxπ ∑Kk=1V
π,νk
1 (x
k
1) achieved by the best fixed pol-
icy in hindsight. We believe doing so would require modifying the algorithm, which is left to
future work.
4.4 Turn-Based Games
The algorithm above can be specialized to online turn-based games. For completeness we provide
resulting algorithm in Appendix A.1 as Algorithm 6. Note that in the turn-based setting, we only
need to solve a unilateral maximization or minimization problem, rather than solving zero-sum
games as is needed in the simultaneous-move setting.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 2, we have the following regret bound for turn-based
games in the online setting.
Corollary 2 (Online, Turn-based). Under Assumption 2, there exists a constant c > 0 such that the
following holds for each fixed p ∈ (0, 1) and any policy sequence ν for P2. Set β = cdH√ι with ι :=
log(2dT/p) in Algorithm 6. Then with probability at least 1− p, Algorithm 6 achieves the regret bound
Regretν(K) .
√
d3H3Tι2.
We prove this corollary in Appendix A.2.1.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 for the offline setting of simultaneous games. We shall make
use of the technical lemmas given in Appendix B. For clarity of exposition, we denote by φkh :=
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φ(xkh, a
k
h, b
k
h) the feature vector encountered in the h-th step of the k-th episode. Our proof consists
of five steps:
i Uniform concentration: We begin by showing that an empirical estimate of the transition
kernel Ph, when acting on the value functions maintained by the algorithm, concentrates
around its expectation. See Section 5.1.
ii Least-squares estimation error: Using the above concentration result, we derive high prob-
ability bounds on the errors of our least-squares estimates of the true Q functions Qπ,νh , re-
cursively in the timestep h. See Section 5.2.
iii UCB and LCB: We next show that the UCBs and LCBs constructed in the algorithms are
indeed valid bounds on the true value functions Vπ,∗h and V
∗,ν
h . See Section 5.3.
iv Recursive decomposition of duality gap: We derive a recursive formula for the difference
between the UCB and LCB in terms of the timestep h. This difference in turn bounds the
duality gap of interest. See Section 5.4.
v Establishing final bound: Bounding each term in the above recursive decomposition in
terms of the least-squares estimation errors, we establish the desired bound on the total
duality gap, thereby completing the proof of the theorem. See Section 5.5.
Below we provide the details of each step.
5.1 Uniform Concentration
The quantity ∑τ∈[k−1] φτhV
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1) can be viewed as an empirical estimate of the unknown pop-
ulation quantity ∑τ∈[k−1] φτh
(
PhV
k
h+1
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h). To control the least-squares estimation error, we
need to show that the empirical estimate concentrates around its population counterpart. The
main challenge in doing so is that V
k
h+1 is constructed using data from previous episodes and
hence depends on φτh for all τ ∈ [k− 1]. We overcome this issue by noting that V
k
h+1 is computed
using the CCE of a finite class of games with payoff matrices in the ǫ-net Qǫ ×Qǫ, as is done in
FIND_CCE. Therefore, we can prove a concentration bound valid uniformly over this class of games
and thereby establish following concentration result. Here we recall that ‖v‖A :=
√
v⊤Av denotes
the weighted ℓ2 norm of a vector v.
Lemma 2 (Concentration). Under the setting of Theorem 1, for each p ∈ (0, 1), the following event E
holds with probability at least 1− p/2:∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)−
(
PhV
k
h+1
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
. dH
√
log(dT/p), ∀(k, h) ∈ [K]× [H],
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
Vkh+1(x
τ
h+1)−
(
PhV
k
h+1
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
. dH
√
log(dT/p), ∀(k, h) ∈ [K]× [H].
Proof. Fix (k, h) ∈ [K]× [H]. Let
Fτ−1 := σ(x1· , a1· , b1· , . . . , xτ−1· , aτ−1· , bτ−1· , xτ1 , aτ1 , bτ1 , . . . , xτh , aτh , bτh) (10)
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be the σ-algebra generated by the data from the first τ − 1 episodes plus that from the first h steps
of the τ-th episode. We note that as actions are randomized, they must also be included in the
definition of the above filtration, unlike in the MDP setting. Also note that φτh , x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h ∈ Fτ−1
and xτh+1 ∈ Fτ.
Fix a pair
(
Q˜,Q˜
)
in the ǫ-netQǫ×Qǫ. For each x ∈ S , let σ˜(x) be the CCE of
(
Q˜(x, ·, ·),Q˜ (x, ·, ·)
)
in the sense of equation (1), and set V˜(x) := E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
[
Q˜(x, a, b)
]
. The randomvariable V˜(xτh+1)−
(PhV˜)(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h), when conditioned on Fτ−1, is zero-mean and H-bounded. Applying Lemma 12
gives ∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
V˜(xτh+1)−
(
PhV˜
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
. dH
√
log(dT/p)
with probability at least 2−Ω(d2 log(dT/p)). Nownote that |Qǫ ×Qǫ| = (Nǫ)2 ≤ 4
(
1+ 8H
√
dk
ǫ
)2d (
1+ β
2
√
d
ǫ2
)2d2
by Lemma 11. By a union bound and the choice that ǫ = 1/(kH), the above inequality holds for
all
(
Q˜,Q˜
)
∈ Qǫ ×Qǫ with probability at least 1− p/2.
Now, for the pair
(
Q
k
h+1,Q
k
h+1
)
, which is in Q ×Q by Lemma 8, let
(
Q˜,Q˜
)
∈ Qǫ ×Qǫ be
the pair in the net as chosen in FIND_CCE. Recall that by construction we have
∥∥∥Q˜− Qkh∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ,
and
∥∥∥Q˜ − Qkh
∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ and Vkh+1(x) = E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h+1(x, a, b)
]
. Therefore, the difference ∆(x) :=
V
k
h+1(x)− V˜(x) satisfies
|∆(x)| =
∣∣∣E(a,b)∼σ˜(x) [Qkh+1(x, a, b)− Q˜(x, a, b)]∣∣∣
≤ E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
∣∣∣Qkh+1(x, a, b)− Q˜(x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ, ∀x ∈ S .
It follows that∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)−
(
PhV
k
h+1
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
V˜(xτh+1)−
(
PhV˜
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
+
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
∆(xτh+1)− (Ph∆) (xτh , aτh , bτh)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
. dH
√
log(dT/p) + ǫ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
‖φτh‖(Λkh)−1
≤ dH
√
log(dT/p) + ǫk,
where the last step follows from Λkh  I and
∥∥φτh∥∥ ≤ 1. Recalling our choice ǫ = 1KH proves the
first inequality in the lemma. The second inequality can be proved in a similar fashion.
5.2 Least-squares Estimation Error
Herewe bound the difference between the algorithm’s action-value functions (without bonus) and
the true action-value functions of any policy pair (π, ν), recursively in terms of the step h.
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Lemma 3 (Least-squares Error Bound). The quantities {wkh,wkh,V
k
h,V
k
h} in Algorithm 1 satisfy the
following. If β = dH
√
ι, where ι = log(2dT/p), then on the event E in Lemma 2, we have for all
(x, a, b, h, k) ∈ S ×A×A× [H]× [K] and any policy pair (π, ν):∣∣∣〈φ(x, a, b),wkh〉− Qπ,νh (x, a, b)−Ph(Vkh+1 −Vπ,νh+1)(x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ ρkh(x, a, b), (11a)∣∣∣〈φ(x, a, b),wkh〉− Qπ,νh (x, a, b)−Ph(Vkh+1 −Vπ,νh+1)(x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ ρkh(x, a, b), (11b)
where ρkh(x, a, b) := β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 .
Proof. We only prove the first inequality (11a). The second inequality can be proved in a similar
fashion.
By Lemma 1 and Bellman equation we have the equality
(φτh)
⊤wπ,νh = Q
π,ν
h (x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) = rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) + (PhV
π,ν
h+1)(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
for all τ ∈ [k− 1]. Multiplying the above equality by (Λkh)−1 φτh and summing over τ, we obtain
that
wπ,νh −
(
Λkh
)−1
wπ,νh =
(
Λkh
)−1(
∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh(φ
τ
h)
⊤
)
wπ,νh
=
(
Λkh
)−1
∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh ·
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) + (PhV
π,ν
h+1)(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]
,
where the first equality above holds because ∑τ∈[k−1] φτh(φ
τ
h)
⊤ = Λkh − I. On the other hand, recall
that by algorithm specification we have wkh = (Λ
k
h)
−1 ∑τ∈[k−1] φτh ·
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)
]
. It
follows that
wkh − wπ,νh = −
(
Λkh
)−1
wπ,νh + (Λ
k
h)
−1 ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh ·
[
V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)− (PhVπ,νh+1)(xτh , aτh , bτh)
]
= −
(
Λkh
)−1
wπ,νh︸ ︷︷ ︸
q1
+ (Λkh)
−1 ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh ·
[
V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)− (PhVkh+1)(xτh , aτh , bτh)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2
+ (Λkh)
−1 ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh ·
[
Ph(V
k
h+1 −Vπ,νh+1)(xτh , aτh , bτh)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q3
.
whence for each (x, a, b):〈
φ(x, a, b),wkh
〉
− Qπ,νh (x, a, b) = 〈φ(x, a, b), q1 + q2 + q3〉 .
We apply Cauchy-Schwarz to bound each RHS term:
1. First term: we have
|〈φ(x, a, b), q1〉| ≤
∥∥wπ,νh ∥∥(Λkh)−1 · ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1
≤ ∥∥wπ,νh ∥∥ · ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 . H√d · ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 ,
where the last two steps follow from Λkh  I and
∥∥wπ,νh ∥∥ . H√d (Lemma 7).
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2. Second term: by Lemma 2 we have
|〈φ(x, a, b), q2〉| . dH
√
log(dT/p) · ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 .
3. Third term: recalling that ∑τ∈[k−1] φτh
(
φτh
)⊤
= Λkh − I and Ph(·|xτh , aτh , bτh) =
(
φτh
)⊤
µh(·), we
have
〈φ(x, a, b), q3〉
=
〈
φ(x, a, b), (Λkh)
−1 ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh (φ
τ
h)
⊤
∫
(V
k
h+1 −Vπ,νh+1)(x′)dµh(x′)
〉
=
〈
φ(x, a, b),
∫
(V
k
h+1 −Vπ,νh+1)(x′)dµh(x′)
〉
−
〈
φ(x, a, b), (Λkh)
−1
∫
(V
k
h+1−Vπ,νh+1)(x′)dµh(x′)
〉
= Ph(V
k
h+1−Vπ,νh+1)(x, a, b) +
〈
φ(x, a, b), (Λkh)
−1
∫
(V
k
h+1−Vπ,νh+1)(x′)dµh(x′)
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2
.
Note that in the above equality we make crucial use of the linearity assumption on the tran-
sition kernel. The term p2 above satisfies the bound
|p2| . ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 · H
√
d,
where we use the facts that Λkh  I, ‖µh(S)‖ ≤
√
d,
∣∣∣Vkh+1(·)∣∣∣ ≤ H, and ∣∣Vπ,νh+1(·)∣∣ ≤ H.
Combining, we obtain∣∣∣〈φ(x, a, b),wkh〉− Qπ,νh (x, a, b)−Ph(Vkh+1 −Vπ,νh+1)(x, a, b)∣∣∣ . dH ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 ≤ β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1
under our choice of β ≍ dH√ι. This completes the proof of the inequality (11a) in the lemma.
The above lemma can be specialized to the value functions of the best response (cf. Remark 1);
for example, it holds that∣∣∣〈φ(x, a, b),wkh〉−Qπ,∗h (x, a, b)−Ph(Vkh+1 −Vπ,∗h+1)(x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ ρkh(x, a, b).
We will make use of this bound and its variants in the subsequent proof.
5.3 Upper and Lower Confidence Bounds
With the above bounds on the estimation errors, we can show that Vkh and V
k
h constructed in the
algorithm are indeed lower and upper bounds for the true value function. To this end, we state a
simple lemma first.
Lemma 4 (Algorithm 2 Finds 2ǫ-CCE). For each (k, h, x), σkh(x) is an 2ǫ-CCE of
(
Q
k
h(x, ·, ·),Qkh(x, ·, ·)
)
in the sense that
E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a, b)
]
≥ Eb∼P2σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a
′, b)
]
− 2ǫ, ∀a′ ∈ A,
E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
[
Qk
h
(x, a, b)
]
≤ Ea∼P1σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a, b
′)
]
+ 2ǫ, ∀b′ ∈ A.
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Proof. Let
(
Q˜,Q˜
)
be the elements in the ǫ-net that are closest to
(
Q
k
h,Q
k
h
)
, as specified in Algo-
rithm 2. This means that
∣∣∣Qkh(x, a, b)− Q˜(x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ and ∣∣∣Qkh(x, a, b)−Q˜ (x, a, b)
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ for all
(x, a, b). Fix an arbitrary x ∈ S . Because σkh(x) = σ˜(x) is an CCE of
(
Q˜(x, ·, ·),Q˜ (x, ·, ·)
)
, we have
for all a′ ∈ A:
E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a, b)
]
= E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
[
Q˜kh(x, a, b)
]
+ E(a,b)∼σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a, b)− Q˜kh(x, a, b)
]
≥ Eb∼P2σ˜(x)
[
Q˜kh(x, a
′, b)
]
− ǫ
= Eb∼P2σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a
′, b)
]
+ Eb∼P2σ˜(x)
[
Q˜kh(x, a
′, b)− Qkh(x, a′, b)
]
− ǫ
≥ Eb∼P2σ˜(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a
′, b)
]
− 2ǫ.
This proves the first inequality in the lemma. The second inequality can be proved in a similar
fashion.
We can now establish the UCB and LCB properties.
Lemma 5 (UCB and LCB). Under the setting of Theorem 1, on the event E in Lemma 2, we have for each
(x, a, b, k, h):
Qk
h
(x, a, b)− 2(H − h+ 1)ǫ (a)≤Qπk,∗h (x, a, b)
(b)≤ Q∗,νkh (x, a, b)
(c)≤ Qkh(x, a, b) + 2(H − h+ 1)ǫ
and
Vkh(x)− 2(H − h+ 2)ǫ
(i)≤Vπk,∗h (x)
(ii)≤ V∗,νkh (x)
(iii)≤ Vkh(x) + 2(H − h+ 2)ǫ.
Proof. The inequalities (b) and (ii) follow from Proposition 1. Below we only prove the upper
bounds (c) and (iii). The lower bounds (a) and (i) can be proved in a similar fashion.
We fix k and perform induction on h. The base case h = H + 1 holds since the terminal cost
is zero. Now assume that the bounds (c) and (iii) hold for step h + 1; that is, Q
k
h+1(x, a, b) ≥
Q∗,ν
k
h+1(x, a, b) − 2(H − h)ǫ and V
k
h+1(x) ≥ V∗,ν
k
h+1(x) − 2(H − h + 1)ǫ for all (x, a, b). By inequal-
ity (11a) in Lemma 3 applied to (π˜, νk) with π˜ being the best response to νk, we have for each
(x, a, b): ∣∣∣〈φ(x, a, b),wkh〉−Q∗,νkh (x, a, b)−Ph (Vkh+1 −V∗,νkh+1) (x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ ρkh(x, a, b),
whence 〈
φ(x, a, b),wkh
〉
+ ρkh(x, a, b) ≥ Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b) + Ph
(
V
k
h+1−V∗,ν
k
h+1
)
(x, a, b),
where we recall that ρkh(x, a, b) := β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 . Under the induction hypothesis, we obtain〈
φ(x, a, b),wkh
〉
+ ρkh(x, a, b) ≥ Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b)− 2(H − h+ 1)ǫ ≥ 0.
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We can now lower-bound Q
k
h(x, a, b):
Q
k
h(x, a, b)
= ΠH
{〈
φ(x, a, b),wkh
〉
+ ρkh(x, a, b)
}
by construction
≥ ΠH
{
Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b)− 2(H − h+ 1)ǫ
}
u ≥ v =⇒ max {min {u,H} ,−H} ≥ max {min {v,H} ,−H}
≥ ΠH
{
Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b)
}
− 2(H − h+ 1)ǫ ΠH is non-expansive
= Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b)− 2(H − h+ 1)ǫ. Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b) ∈ [−H,H]
This proves the inequality (c) for step h.
Finally, recall that νkh(x) := P2σkh(x), and let br(νkh(x)) denote the best response to νkh(x) with
respect to Q∗,ν
k
h (x, ·, ·); i.e.,
br(νkh(x)) := argmax
A∈∆
Ea∼A,b∼νkh(x)
[
Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b)
]
.
We then have for all x:
V
k
h(x) := E(a,b)∼σkh(x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a, b)
]
by construction
≥ Ea′∼br(νkh(x)),b∼P2σkh (x)
[
Q
k
h(x, a
′, b)
]
− 2ǫ σkh(x) is 2ǫ-CCE by Lemma4
≥ Ea′∼br(νkh(x)),b∼P2σkh (x)
[
Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a
′, b)
]
− 2(H − h+ 1)ǫ− 2ǫ inequality (c) we just proved
= Ea∼br(νkh(x)),b∼νkh(x)
[
Q∗,ν
k
h (x, a, b)
]
− 2(H − h+ 2)ǫ definition of πkh(x) and νkh(x)
= V∗,ν
k
h (x)− 2(H − h+ 2)ǫ.
This proves inequality (iii) for step h.
5.4 Recursive Decomposition of Duality Gap
Thanks to Lemma 5 established above, the difference of the UCB and LCB, namely δkh := V
k
h(x
k
h)−
Vkh(x
k
h), is an (approximate) upper bound on the duality gap V
∗,νk
h (x
k
h) − Vπ
k,∗
h (x
k
h). Setting the
stage for bounding the duality gap, we show below that δkh can be decomposed recursively into
the sum of δkh+1 and some error terms.
Lemma 6 (Recursive Decomposition). Define the random variables
δkh := V
k
h(x
k
h)−Vkh(xkh),
ζkh := E
[
δkh+1 | xkh, akh, bkh
]
− δkh+1,
γkh := E(a,b)∼σkh(xkh)
[
Q
k
h(x
k
h, a
k
h, b)
]
− Qkh(xkh, akh, bkh),
γk
h
:= E(a,b)∼σkh(xkh)
[
Qk
h
(xkh, a, b
k
h)
]
−Qk
h
(xkh, a
k
h, b
k
h).
Then on the event E in Lemma 2, we have for all (k, h),
δkh ≤ δkh+1 + ζkh + γkh − γkh + 4β
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h.
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Proof. For each (x, a, b, k, h), by construction we have
Q
k
h(x, a, b)− Qkh(x, a, b) =
[
(wkh)
⊤φ(x, a, b) + β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1
]
−
[
(wkh)
⊤φ(x, a, b)− β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1
]
=
(
wkh − wkh
)⊤
φ(x, a, b) + 2β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 .
The inequalities (11a) and (11b) in Lemma 3 ensure that(
wkh − wkh
)⊤
φ(x, a, b) ≤ Ph
(
V
k
h+1−Vkh+1
)
(x, a, b) + 2β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 ,
hence by plugging back we obtain the bound
Q
k
h(x, a, b)−Qkh(x, a, b) ≤ Ph
(
V
k
h+1 −Vkh+1
)
(x, a, b) + 4β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 . (12)
On the other hand, observe that by definition,
δkh := V
k
h(x
k
h)−Vkh(xkh)
= E(a,b)∼σkh(xkh)
[
Q
k
h(x
k
h, a, b)
]
−E(a,b)∼σkh(xkh)
[
Qk
h
(xkh, a, b)
]
= Q
k
h(x
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)−Qkh(xkh, akh, bkh)
+
(
E(a,b)∼σkh(xkh)
[
Q
k
h(x
k
h, a, b)
]
−Qkh(xkh, akh, bkh)
)
−
(
E(a,b)∼σkh(xkh)Q
k
h
[
(xkh, a, b)
]
− Qk
h
(xkh, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)
= Q
k
h(x
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)−Qkh(xkh, akh, bkh) + γkh − γkh.
Applying the inequality (12), we obtain
δkh ≤ Ph
(
V
k
h+1 −Vkh+1
)
(xkh, a
k
h, b
k
h) + 4β
∥∥∥φ(xkh, akh)∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1 + γ
k
h − γkh
= E
[
δkh+1 | xkh, akh, bkh
]
+ 4β
∥∥∥φkh∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1 + γ
k
h − γkh
= δkh+1 + ζ
k
h + 4β
∥∥∥φkh∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1 + γ
k
h − γkh
as desired.
5.5 Establishing Duality Gap Bound
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. First observe that on the event E in Lemma 2 (which holds
with probability at least 1− p/2), we have for all k ∈ [K]:
V∗,ν
k
1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,∗
1 (x
k
1) ≤ Vk1(xk1)−Vk1(xk1) + 8Hǫ Lemma 5
≤ Vk1(xk1)−Vk1(xk1) +
8
K
. by the choice ǫ =
1
KH
This proves the first inequality (6) in Theorem 1.
We next bound the cumulated difference between the UCB and LCB that appear in the RHS of
the last inequality. We have
K
∑
k=1
[
V
k
1(x
k
1)−Vk1(xk1)
]
=
K
∑
k=1
δk1 definition of δ
k
1
≤
K
∑
k=1
H
∑
h=1
(ζkh + γ
k
h − γkh) + 4β
K
∑
k=1
H
∑
h=1
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h. Lemma 6
We bound the first two RHS terms separately.
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• For the first term, we know that (ζkh + γkh − γkh) is a martingale difference sequence (with
respect to both h and k), and
∣∣∣ζkh + γkh − γkh∣∣∣ ≤ 6H. Hence by Azuma-Hoeffding, we have
with probability at least 1− p/2,
K
∑
k=1
H
∑
h=1
(ζkh + γ
k
h − γkh) . H ·
√
KHι.
• For the second term, we apply the Elliptical Potential Lemma 10 to obtain
H
∑
h=1
K
∑
k=1
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h ≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K
√√√√ K∑
k=1
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h Jensen’s inequality
≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K ·
√√√√2 log(detΛKh
detΛ0h
)
Lemma 10
≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K ·
√√√√2 log( (λ+ Kmaxk ∥∥φkh∥∥2)d
λd
)
by construction of Λkh
≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K ·
√
2d log
(
λ+ K
λ
) ∥∥∥φkh∥∥∥ ≤ 1, ∀h, k by assumption
≤ H
√
2Kdι.
Combining the above inequalities, we obtain that with probability at least 1− p/2,
K
∑
k=1
[
V
k
1(x
k
1)−Vk1(xk1)
]
. H
√
HKι+ 4β · H
√
2Kdι .
√
d3H3Tι2,
by our choice of β ≍ dH√ι and the fact that T = KH. This proves the second inequality (7) in
Theorem 1.
Finally, recalling the definition of Gap(K) and combining the inequalities (6) and (7) we just
proved, we obtain that with probability at least 1− p,
Gap(K) :=
K
∑
k=1
[
V∗,ν
k
1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,∗
1 (x
k
1)
]
≤
K
∑
k=1
[
V
k
1(x
k
1)−Vk1(xk1)
]
+ 8 .
√
d3H3Tι2,
thereby proving the third inequality (8) in Theorem 1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop provably efficient reinforcement learning methods for zero-sumMarkov
Games with simultaneous moves and a linear structure. To ensure efficient exploration, our algo-
rithms construct appropriate UCB/LCB for both players and make crucial use of the concept of
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Coarse Correlated Equilibrium. We provide regret bounds under both the offline and online set-
tings. Corollaries of these bounds apply to turn-based games and the tabular settings. Our results
build on and generalize work on learning MDPs with linear structures, and at the same time high-
light the crucial differences and new challenges in the game setting.
A number of directions are of interest for future research. An immediate step is to investigate
whether the dependence on the dimension d and horizon H in our bounds can be improved and
what are the optimal scaling. It would also be interesting to improve our online regret bounds to
exploit a weak opponent, in the sense that we can compete with the best response to the opponent,
not just competing with the NE. Generalizations to general-sum Markov games, as well as to
games with more complicated, nonlinear structures, are also of great interest.
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Appendices
A Algorithms and Proofs for Turn-based Games
In this section, we present our algorithms for turn-based games and prove the performance guar-
antees in Corollaries 1 and 2.
A.1 Offline Setting
In this, the algorithm for turn-based games is given in Algorithm 4, which is derived by specializ-
ing the corresponding simultaneous-move Algorithm 1 to the turn-based setting.
The algorithm involves the subroutines FIND_MAX and FIND_MIN, which are derived by special-
izing the FIND_CCE routine in Algorithm 2 to the turn-based setting. For completeness we provide
below a description of these two subroutines. LetQ be the class of functions Q : S ×A → R with
the parametric form
Q(x, a) = 〈w, φ(x, a)〉+ ρβ
√
φ(x, a)⊤Aφ(x, a),
where the parameter (w, A, ρ) satisfy ‖w‖ ≤ 2H√dk, ‖A‖F ≤ β2
√
d and ρ ∈ {±1}. Let Qǫ
be a fixed ǫ-covering of Q with respect to the ℓ∞ norm. With these notations, the subroutine
FIND_MAX is given in Algorithm 5, and the subroutine FIND_MIN is given by FIND_MIN(Q, x) =
FIND_MAX(−Q, x).
Informally, one may simply think of FIND_MAX(Q, x) as argmaxa Q(x, a) and FIND_MIN(Q, x) as
argmina Q(x, a). As in the simultaneous move setting, these subroutines are introduced for the
technical considerations explained in Section 3.2.1.
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Algorithm 4 Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration (Turn-Based, Offline)
1: Input: bonus parameter β > 0.
2: for episode k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
3: Receive initial state xk1.
4: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 2, 1 do ⊲ update policy
5: Λkh ← ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh)φ(xτh , aτh)⊤ + I.
6: wkh ← (Λkh)−1 ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh)
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)
]
.
7: wkh ← (Λkh)−1 ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh)
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)
]
.
8: Q
k
h(·, ·) ← ΠH
{
(wkh)
⊤φ(·, ·) + β
√
φ(·, ·)⊤(Λkh)−1φ(·, ·)
}
9: Qk
h
(·, ·) ← ΠH
{
(wkh)
⊤φ(·, ·)− β
√
φ(·, ·)⊤(Λkh)−1φ(·, ·)
}
10: Letπ
k
h(·) ← FIND_MAX
(
Q
k
h, ·
)
,V
k
h(·) ← Qkh
(·,πkh(·)) ,Vkh(·) ← Qkh (·,πkh(·)) I(·) = 1
νkh(·) ← FIND_MIN
(
Qk
h
, ·
)
,V
k
h(·) ← Qkh
(·, νkh(·)) ,Vkh(·)← Qkh (·, νkh(·)) I(·) = 2
11: end for
12: for step h = 1, 2, . . . ,H do ⊲ execute policy
13: if I(xkh) = 1, P1 takes action a
k
h = π
k
h(x
k
h),
14: else if I(xkh) = 2, P2 takes action a
k
h = ν
k
h(x
k
h).
15: Observe next state xkh+1.
16: end for
17: end for
Algorithm 5 FIND_MAX
1: Input: Q, x and discretization parameter ǫ > 0.
2: Pick Q˜ ∈ Qǫ satisfying
∥∥∥Q˜−Q∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ.
3: For the input x, let a˜ = argmaxa Q˜(x, a).
4: Output: a˜.
A.1.1 Proof of Corollary 1
We prove Corollary 1 by specializing Theorem 1 to the turn-based setting. Specifically, as argued
in Section 2.3, linear turn-based game is a special case of linear simultaneous games with
φ(x, a, b) ≡ φ(x, a), rh(x, a, b) ≡ r(x, a), Ph(x, a, b) ≡ Ph(x, a), if x ∈ S1,
φ(x, a, b) ≡ φ(x, b), rh(x, a, b) ≡ r(x, b), Ph(x, a, b) ≡ Ph(x, b), if x ∈ S2.
(13)
Moreover, Algorithm 1, when applied to the turn-based setting, degenerates to Algorithm 4. To
see this, note that under the degeneration of φ(x, a, b) in (13), the values Q
k
h and Q
k
h
computed in
Algorithm 1 only depend on the action of the active player; that is,
Q
k
h(x, a, b) ≡ Qkh(x, a), if x ∈ S1,
Qk
h
(x, a, b) ≡ Qk
h
(x, b), if x ∈ S2.
(14)
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In this case, one can verify that finding the CCE (cf. equation (1)) as done in FIND_CCE degenerates
to a unilateral maximization orminimization problem, namely argmaxa Q˜(x, a) or argmina Q˜(x, a).
This is exactly what the subroutines FIND_MAX and FIND_MIN compute. With the above reduction,
Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorem 1.
A.2 Online Setting
In this setting, the algorithm for turn-based games is given in Algorithm 6, which is derived by
specializing the corresponding simultaneous-move Algorithm 3 to the turn-based setting.
Algorithm 6 Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration (Turn-Based, Online)
1: Input: bonus parameter β > 0.
2: for episode k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
3: Receive initial state xk1.
4: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 2, 1 do ⊲ update policy
5: Λkh ← ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh)φ(xτh , aτh)⊤ + I.
6: wkh ← (Λkh)−1 ∑k−1τ=1 φ(xτh , aτh)
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
h+1)
]
.
7: Qkh(·, ·) ← ΠH
{
(wkh)
⊤φ(·, ·) + β
√
φ(·, ·)⊤(Λkh)−1φ(·, ·)
}
.
8: Vkh (·)←
{
maxa Qkh+1(·, a) if I(·) = 1,
mina Qkh+1(·, a) if I(·) = 2.
9: end for
10: for step h = 1, 2, . . . ,H do ⊲ execute policy
11: if I(xkh) = 1, take action a
k
h = argmaxa Q
k
h(x
k
h, a),
12: else do nothing and let P2 play.
13: Observe next state xkh+1.
14: end for
15: end for
A.2.1 Proof of Corollary 2
We prove Corollary 2 by specializing Theorem 2 to the turn-based setting. The argument is essen-
tially the same as that in the proof of Corollary 1 above. We omit the details.
B Technical Lemmas
The proofs of our main Theorems 1 and 2 involve several common steps. We summarize these
steps as several lemmas, which are either proved below or are standard in the literature.
B.1 Boundedness of Linear Coefficients
We begin with two simple lemmas about boundedness of the linear coefficients of Q functions.
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Lemma 7 (True Coefficients Are Bounded). Under Assumption 1, for each policy pair (π, ν) of P1 and
P2, the linear coefficient of their action-value function Qπ,νh (x, a, b) =
〈
φ(x, a, b),wπ,νh
〉
satisfies∥∥wπ,νh ∥∥ ≤ 2H√d, ∀h ∈ [H].
Proof. From the Bellman equation, we have
φ(x, a, b)⊤wπ,νh = Q
π,ν
h (x, a, b) = rh(x, a, b) + (PhV
π,ν
h+1)(x, a, b)
= φ(x, a, b)⊤θh +
∫
Vπ,νh+1(x
′)φ(x, a, b)⊤dµh(x′), ∀x, a, b, h.
Assuming that {φ(x, a, b)} spans Rd and solving the linear equation, we obtain
wπ,νh = θh +
∫
Vπ,νh+1(x
′)dµh(x′).
Under the normalization Assumption 1, we have ‖θh‖ ≤
√
d, ‖µh(S)‖ ≤
√
d and
∣∣Vπ,νh+1(x′)∣∣ ≤ H.
It follows that ∥∥wπ,νh ∥∥ ≤ √d+ H√d ≤ 2H√d
as desired.
An immediate consequence of the above lemma is that
∥∥wπ,∗h ∥∥ ≤ 2H√d and ∥∥w∗,νh ∥∥ ≤ 2H√d;
cf. Remark 1.
Lemma 8 (Algorithm Coefficients Are Bounded). The coefficients {wkh,wkh} in Algorithm 1 and the
coefficients {wkh} in Algorithm 3 satisfy∥∥∥wkh∥∥∥ ≤ 2H√dk, ∥∥∥wkh∥∥∥ ≤ 2H√dk, and ∥∥∥wkh∥∥∥ ≤ 2H√dk, ∀(k, h) ∈ [K]× [H].
Proof. We only prove the last inequality. The other two inequalities can be established in exactly
the same way. For each k and h, we have
∥∥∥wkh∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥(Λkh)−1 k−1∑
τ=1
φ(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
[
rh(x
τ
h , a
τ
h , b
τ
h) +V
k
h+1(x
τ
t+1)
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤
k−1
∑
τ=1
∥∥∥∥(Λkh)−1 φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)∥∥∥∥ · 2H |rh| ≤ H, ∣∣∣Vkh+1∣∣∣ ≤ H
≤
k−1
∑
τ=1
∥∥∥∥(Λkh)−1/2∥∥∥∥ · ‖φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)‖(Λkh)−1 · 2H
≤
√√√√k k−1∑
τ=1
∥∥φ(xτh , aτh , bτh)∥∥2(Λkh)−1 · 2H Λkh  I and Jensen’s
≤
√
kd · 2H, Lemma 9
thereby proving the last inequality in the lemma.
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B.2 Inequalities for Summations
We next state two lemmas for summations. The first lemma is from Jin et al. (2019, Lemma D.1).
Lemma 9 (Simple Upper Bound). If Λt = λI + ∑i∈[t] φiφ⊤i , where φi ∈ Rd and λ > 0, then
∑
i∈[t]
φ⊤i Λ
−1
t φi ≤ d.
The second lemma can be found in Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011, Lemma 11) and Jin et al. (2019,
Lemma D.2).
Lemma 10 (Elliptical Potential Lemma). Suppose that {φt}t ≥ 0 is a sequence in Rd satisfying ‖φt‖ ≤
1, ∀t. Let Λ0 ∈ Rd×d be a positive definite matrix, and Λt = Λ0 + ∑i∈[t] φiφ⊤i . If the smallest eigenvalue
of Λ0 satisfies λmin(Λ0) ≥ 1, then
log
(
detΛt
detΛ0
)
≤ ∑
j∈[t]
φ⊤j Λ
−1
j−1φj ≤ 2 log
(
detΛt
detΛ0
)
, ∀t.
B.3 Covering and Concentration Inequalities for Self-normalized Processes
The first lemma below is useful for establishing uniform concentration. Recall the function class
Q defined in the text around equation (5).
Lemma 11 (Covering). The ǫ-covering number of Q with respect to the ℓ∞ norm satisfies
Nǫ ≤ 2
(
1+
8H
√
dk
ǫ
)d(
1+
8β2
√
d
ǫ2
)d2
.
Proof. For any two functions Q,Q′ ∈ Q with parameters (w, A, ρ) and (w′, A′, ρ), we have∥∥Q− Q′∥∥
∞
= sup
x,a,b
∣∣∣∣ΠH {〈w, φ(x, a, b)〉+ ρβ√φ(x, a, b)⊤Aφ(x, a, b)}−ΠH {〈w′, φ(x, a, b)〉− ρβ√φ(x, a, b)⊤A′φ(x, a, b)}∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
φ:‖φ‖≤1
∣∣∣∣〈w−w′, φ〉+ ρβ√φ⊤Aφ− ρβ√φ⊤A′φ∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
φ:‖φ‖≤1
∣∣〈w−w′, φ〉∣∣+ sup
φ:‖φ‖≤1
√
|φ⊤(A− A′)φ|
≤ ∥∥w−w′∥∥+√‖A− A′‖F,
where the second last inequality follows due to the fact that |√x−√y| ≤ √|x− y| holds for any
x, y ≥ 0.
Therefore, a 0-cover Cρ of {±1}, an ǫ/2-cover Cw of
{
w ∈ Rd : ‖w‖ ≤ 2H√dk
}
and an ǫ2/4-
cover CA of
{
A ∈ Rd×d : ‖A‖F ≤ β2
√
d
}
implies an ǫ-cover of Q. It follows that
Nǫ ≤
∣∣Cρ∣∣ |Cw| |CA| ≤ 2
(
1+
8H
√
dk
ǫ
)d(
1+
8β2
√
d
ǫ2
)d2
,
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where the last step follows from standard bounds on the covering number of Euclidean Balls, e.g.,
Vershynin (2012, Lemma 5.2).
The next lemma, originally from Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011, Theorem 1), is now standard in
the bandit literature.
Lemma 12 (Concentration for Self-normalized Processes). Suppose {ǫt}t≥1 is a scalar stochastic
process generating the filtration {Ft}t≥0, and ǫt|Ft−1 is zero mean and σ-subGaussian. Let {φt}t≥1
be an Rd-valued stochastic process with φt ∈ Ft−1. Suppose Λ0 ∈ Rd×d is positive definite, and
Λt = Λ0 + ∑
t
s=1 φsφ
⊤
s . Then for each δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ, we have∥∥∥∥∥ t∑
s=1
φsǫs
∥∥∥∥∥
2
Λ−1t
≤ 2σ2 log
[
det(Λt)1/2det(Λ0)−1/2
δ
]
, ∀t ≥ 0.
C Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 for the online setting of simultaneous games. We shall make
use of the technical lemmas given in Appendix B. Recall the shorthand φkh := φ(x
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h). The
proof follows a similar strategy as that for the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 5. In particular, our
proof consists of five steps as presented in the subsections to follow.
C.1 Uniform Concentration
In the online setting, the value function estimateVkh+1(x) is computed using the NE of the zero-sum
game defined by a single payoff matrix Qkh+1(x, ·, ·). It is easier to establish uniform concentration
in this setting. To see why, we recall the function class Q defined in the text around equation (5),
and introduce the related function class
V :=
{
V : S → R,V(x) = max
A∈∆
min
B∈∆
Ea∈A,b∈BQ(x, a, b),Q ∈ Q
}
.
In words, V contains the possible values of the NEs of the zero-sum matrix games in Q. As
we show in the lemma below, an ǫ-cover of the set Q immediately induces an ǫ-cover of the
set V , thanks to the non-expansiveness of the maximin operator for zero-sum games. (Note that
general-sum games and their CCEs do not have such a non-expansiveness property in general;
see Appendix E for details.)
Lemma 13 (Covering). The ǫ-covering number of V with respect to the ℓ∞ norm is upper bounded by
Nǫ ≤ 2
(
1+
8H
√
dk
ǫ
)d(
1+
8β2
√
d
ǫ2
)d2
.
Proof. For any two functionsV,V ′ ∈ V , let them take the formV(·) = maxA∈∆ minB∈∆ Ea∈A,b∈BQ(·, a, b)
and V ′(·) = maxA∈∆ minB∈∆ Ea∈A,b∈BQ′(·, a, b) with Q,Q′ ∈ Q. Since the maximin operator is
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non-expansive, we have
∥∥V −V ′∥∥
∞
= sup
x
∣∣∣∣maxA∈∆ minB∈∆ Ea∈A,b∈BQ(·, a, b)−maxA∈∆ minB∈∆ Ea∈A,b∈BQ′(·, a, b)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
x,a,b
∣∣Q(x, a, b)−Q′(x, a, b)∣∣
=
∥∥Q− Q′∥∥
∞
.
Therefore, an ǫ-cover of Q induces an ǫ-cover of V , and hence the ǫ-covering number of V is
upper bounded by the ǫ-covering number of Q. Recalling that the latter number is bounded in
Lemma 11, we complete the proof of the desired bound.
Lemma 14 (Concentration). Under the setting of Theorem 2, for each p ∈ (0, 1), the following event E
holds with probability at least 1− p/2:∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
Vkh+1(x
τ
h+1)−
(
PhV
k
h+1
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
. dH
√
log(dT/p), ∀(k, h) ∈ [K]× [H].
Proof. Fix (k, h) ∈ [K]× [H]. Define the filtration {Fτ} as in equation (10).
Set ǫ = 1K and let Vǫ be a minimal ǫ-net of V . Fix a function V˜ ∈ Vǫ. The random vari-
able V˜(xτh+1) − PhV˜(xτh), when conditioned on Fτ−1, is zero-mean and 2H-bounded. Applying
Lemma 12 gives∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
(
V˜(xτh+1)−PhV˜(xτh , aτh , bτh)
)∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
. dH
√
log(dT/p)
with probability at least 2−Ω(d2 log(dT/p)). Now note that |Vǫ| = Nǫ ≤ 2
(
1+ 8H
√
dk
ǫ
)d (
1+ β
2
√
d
ǫ2
)d2
by Lemma 13. By a union bound, the above inequality holds for all V˜ ∈ Vǫ with probability at
least 1− p/2.
Now, for each Vkh+1 ∈ V (the inclusion follows from Lemma 8), let V˜ ∈ Vǫ be the closest point
in the net. The difference ∆ = Vkh+1− V˜ satisfies ‖∆‖∞ ≤ ǫ. It follows that∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
Vkh+1(x
τ
h+1)−
(
PhV
k
h+1
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
V˜(xτh+1)−
(
PhV˜
)
(xτh , a
τ
h , b
τ
h)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
+
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
φτh
[
∆(xτh+1)− (Ph∆) (xτh , aτh , bτh)
]∥∥∥∥∥
(Λkh)
−1
.dH
√
log(dT/p) + ǫ ∑
τ∈[k−1]
‖φτh‖(Λkh)−1
≤dH
√
log(dT/p) +
1
K
· k,
where the last step follows from ǫ = 1K , Λ
k
h  I and
∥∥φτh∥∥ ≤ 1. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
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C.2 Least-squares Estimation Error
Here we bound the difference between the algorithm’s value function (without bonus) and the
true value function of any policy π, recursively in terms of the step h.
Lemma 15 (Least-squares Error Bound). The quantities {wkh,Vkh } in Algorithm 3 satisfy the following.
If β = dH
√
ι, then on the event E in Lemma 14, we have for all (x, a, b, h, k) and any policy pair (π, ν):∣∣∣〈φ(x, a, b),wkh〉− Qπ,νh (x, a, b)−Ph(Vkh+1−Vπ,νh+1)(x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ ρkh(x, a, b), (15)
where ρkh(x, a, b) := β
√
φ(x, a, b)⊤
(
Λkh
)−1
φ(x, a, b).
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 3, except that we use the concentration
result in Lemma 14 instead of Lemma 2.
C.3 Upper Confidence Bounds
Here we establish the desired UCB property.
Lemma 16 (UCB). On the event E in Lemma 2, we have for all (x, a, b, k, h):
Qkh(x, a, b) ≥ Q∗h(x, a, b), Vkh (x) ≥ V∗h (x).
Proof. We fix k and perform induction on h. The base case h = H holds since the terminal cost is
zero. Now assume that the bounds hold for step h + 1; that is, Qkh+1(x, a, b) ≥ Q∗h+1(x, a, b) and
Vkh+1(x) ≥ V∗h+1(x), ∀(x, a, b). By construction we have
Qkh(x, a, b) = ΠH
{〈
φ(x, a, b),wkh
〉
+ β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1
}
.
On the other hand, note that Q∗h = Q
π∗,ν∗
h and V
∗
h = V
π∗,ν∗
h , hence by inequality (15) in Lemma 3
applied to (π, ν) = (π∗, ν∗), we have∣∣∣〈φ(x, a, b),wkh〉− Q∗h(x, a, b)−Ph(Vkh+1−V∗h+1)(x, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ β ‖φ(x, a, b)‖(Λkh)−1 .
Plugging back we obtain
Qkh(x, a, b) ≥ ΠH
{
Q∗h(x, a, b) + Ph(V
k
h+1−V∗h+1)(x, a, b)
}
.
Under the induction hypothesis, we have Vkh+1(x)−V∗h+1(x) ≥ 0 for each x ∈ S , whence
Qkh(x, a, b) ≥ ΠH {Q∗h(x, a, b)} = Q∗h(x, a, b).
Consequently, we have
Vkh (x) = max
A∈∆
min
B∈∆
Ea∼A,b∼B
[
Qkh(x, a, b)
]
algorithm specification
≥ max
A∈∆
min
B∈∆
Ea∼A,b∼B [Q∗h(x, a, b)]
= V∗h (x). definition
We conclude that the bounds hold for step h.
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C.4 Recursive Regret Decomposition
Thanks to Lemma 16, the regret V∗1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1) of interest is upper bounded by the difference
Vk1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1) between the empirical value (with bonus) and true value of the agent’s policy
πk. We next derive a recursive (in h) formula for this difference.
Lemma 17 (Recursive Decomposition). Define the random variables
δkh := V
k
h (x
k
h)−Vπ
k,νk
h (x
k
h),
ζkh := E
[
δkh+1 | xkh, akh, bkh
]
− δkh+1,
γkh := Ea∼πkh(xkh)
[
Qkh(x
k
h, a, b
k
h)
]
− Qkh(xkh, akh, bkh),
γ̂kh := Ea∼πk(xkh),b∼νkh(xkh)
[
Qπ
k,νk
h (x
k
h, a, b)
]
−Qπk,νkh (xkh, akh, bkh).
Then on the event E in Lemma 2, we have for all (k, h):
δkh ≤ δkh+1 + ζkh + γkh − γ̂kh + 2β
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h.
Proof. By algorithm specification and the fact that (πkh(x
k
h), B0) is the NE of Q
k
h(x
k
h, ·, ·), we have
Vkh (x
k
h) = min
b
Ea∼πkh(xkh)
[
Qkh(x
k
h, a, b)
]
≤ Ea∼πkh(xkh)
[
Qkh(x
k
h, a, b
k
h)
]
= Qkh(x
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) + γ
k
h,
and by definition we have
Vπ
k,νk
h (x
k
h) = Ea∼πk(xkh),b∼νkh(xkh)
[
Qπ
k,νk
h (x
k
h, a, b)
]
= Qπ
k,νk
h (x
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) + γ̂
k
h.
It follows that
δkh ≤ Qkh(xkh, akh, bkh)−Qπ
k,νk
h (x
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) + γ
k
h − γ̂kh.
On the other hand, by construction of Qkh and Lemma 11, we have for all (x, a, b),
Qkh(x, a, b)− Qπ
k,νk
h (x, a, b) ≤ Ph(Vkh+1−Vπ
k,νk
h+1 )(x, a, b) + 2β
√
φ(x, a, b)⊤
(
Λkh
)−1
φ(x, a, b).
Combining pieces, we obtain that
δkh ≤ Ph(Vkh+1−Vπ
k,νk
h+1 )(x
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) + γ
k
h − γ̂kh + 2β
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h
= E
[
δkh+1 | xkh, akh, bkh
]
+ γkh − γ̂kh + 2β
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h
= δkh+1 + ζ
k
h + γ
k
h − γ̂kh + 2β
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h
as desired.
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C.5 Establishing Regret Bound
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2. First observe that
Regret(K) :=
K
∑
k=1
[
V∗1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1)
]
definition
≤
K
∑
k=1
[
Vk1 (x
k
1)−Vπ
k,νk
1 (x
k
1)
]
Vk1 (x
k
1) ≥ V∗h (xk1) by Lemma 16
=
K
∑
k=1
δk1 definition
≤
K
∑
k=1
H
∑
h=1
(ζkh + γ
k
h − γ̂kh) + 2β
K
∑
k=1
H
∑
h=1
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h. Lemma 17
We bound the two RHS terms separately.
• For the first term, we know that (ζkh + γkh − γ̂kh) is a martingale difference sequence (with
respect to both h and k), and
∣∣ζkh + γkh − γ̂kh∣∣ ≤ 6H. Hence by Azuma-Hoeffding, we have
w.h.p.
K
∑
k=1
H
∑
h=1
(ζkh + γ
k
h − γ̂kh) . H ·
√
KHι = H
√
Tι.
• For the second term, we apply the Elliptical Potential Lemma 10 to obtain
H
∑
h=1
K
∑
k=1
√
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h ≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K
√√√√ K∑
k=1
(φkh)
⊤(Λkh)−1φ
k
h Jensen’s inequality
≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K ·
√√√√2 log(detΛKh
detΛ0h
)
Lemma 10
≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K ·
√√√√2 log( (λ+ Kmaxk ∥∥φkh∥∥2)d
λd
)
by construction of Λkh
≤
H
∑
h=1
√
K ·
√
2d log
(
λ+ K
λ
) ∥∥∥φkh∥∥∥ ≤ 1, ∀h, k by assumption
≤ H
√
2Kdι.
Combining, we obtain that
Regret(K) . H
√
Tι+ β · H
√
2Kdι .
√
d3H3Tι2
by our choice of β ≍ dH√ι. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
D Efficient Implementation of FIND_CCE
The main computation step in FIND_CCE involves finding an element in the fixed ǫ-cover Qǫ that
is close to a given function Q ∈ Q. Here we discuss how to efficiently implement this procedure
without explicitly maintaining the cover Qǫ.
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Recall that each element in the function class Q is defined by a pair (w, A) ∈ Rd ×Rd×d; see
equation (5). Therefore, the cover Qǫ is induced, up to scaling, by an ǫ-cover Cw in ℓ2 norm of the
Euclidean ball Bw :=
{
w ∈ Rd : ‖w‖ ≤ 1} as well as an ǫ2-cover CA of the ball BA := {A ∈
R
d×d : ‖A‖F ≤ 1
}
; cf. the proof of Lemma 11. We may replace Cw by a cover Cw,∞ in the ℓ∞ norm;
similarly for CA. Clearly, an ℓ∞ cover is also an ℓ2 cover; moreover, using an ℓ∞ cover allows for
efficient computation of near neighbors by simple rounding. The price we pay is an additional
dimension factor d in the covering number, which eventually goes into the log term.
We now provide the details for covering Bw; the idea applies similarly to covering BA.
Lemma 18. Let ǫ > 0 be a given accuracy parameter. There exists a set Cw,∞ satisfying the following: (i)
log |Cw,∞| ≤ d log
(
1+ 2
√
d
ǫ
)
; (ii) for each vector w ∈ Bw, we can find, in O(d) time, a vector w˜ ∈ Cw,∞
that satisfies ‖w˜− w‖∞ ≤ ǫ√d and hence ‖w˜− w‖ ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Set ǫ0 := ǫ√d . We discretize the interval G := [−1, 1] into an ǫ0-grid as
Gǫ0 :=
{
kǫ0 : k = −
⌊
1
ǫ0
⌋
,−
⌊
1
ǫ0
⌋
+ 1, . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
⌊
1
ǫ0
⌋
− 1,
⌊
1
ǫ0
⌋}
.
We then let Cw,∞ := (Gǫ0)d. The log cardinality of Cw,∞ is
log |Cw,∞| = log |Gǫ0 |d = log
(
1+ 2
⌊
1
ǫ0
⌋)d
≤ d log
(
1+
2
√
d
ǫ
)
,
as claimed in part (i) of the lemma. Compare this bound with the log cardinality of the optimal
ǫ-cover in ℓ2 norm of
{
w ∈ Rd : ‖w‖ ≤ 1}: log |Cw| ≍ d log (1+ 2ǫ) . We see that the former is only
logarithmic larger than the latter.
Moreover, for each vector w in the ball
{
w′ ∈ Rd : ‖w′‖ ≤ 1}, we can efficiently find a vector
w˜ ∈ Cw,∞ that satisfies ‖w˜− w‖∞ ≤ ǫ√d and hence ‖w˜− w‖ ≤ ǫ. To do this, we simply let
w˜i =
⌊ |wi|
ǫ0
⌋
· ǫ0 · sign(wi), for each i ∈ [d],
with the convention that sign(0) = 0. Note that w˜ can be computed in O(d) time. Moreover, since
‖w‖ ≤ 1, for each i ∈ [d] we have |wi| ≤ 1 and hence⌊ |wi|
ǫ0
⌋
∈
{
0, 1, . . . ,
⌊
1
ǫ0
⌋}
,
which means w˜i ∈ Gǫ0 . It follows that w˜ ∈ (Gǫ0)d = Cw,∞ as claimed. Finally, the approximation
accuracy satisfies
‖w˜−w‖∞ = max
i∈[d]
∣∣∣∣⌊ |wi|ǫ0
⌋
· ǫ0 · sign(wi)− wi
∣∣∣∣
= ǫ0max
i∈[d]
∣∣∣∣⌊ |wi|ǫ0
⌋
· sign(wi)− |wi|
ǫ0
· sign(wi)
∣∣∣∣ wi = |wi| · sign(wi)
≤ ǫ0max
i∈[d]
1 · |sign(wi)| |⌊x⌋ − x| ≤ 1
≤ ǫ0 = ǫ√
d
.
This proves part (ii) of the lemma.
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E Instability of the Value of General-SumGame
In the analysis of our algorithms (in particular, in proving uniform concentration in the proof of
Theorem 1), we encounter the following question: Is the value of the CCE of a general-sum game
stable under perturbation to the payoff matrices? Here we show that the answer is negative in
general, by demonstrating a counter example.
Consider a two-player general-sum matrix game, and recall our convention that player 1 tries
to maximize and player 2 tries to minimize (cf. Section 2.1). Let ui : A ×A → R be the payoff
matrix of player i ∈ {1, 2}, such that player i receives the payoff ui(a, b) when players 1 and 2
take actions a and b, respectively. Let σ ∈ ∆(A×A) be any notion of CCE that is unique; e.g., the
social-optimal or max-entropy CCE. In this equilibrium, the expected payoff of player i is
Vi(u1, u2) := E(a,b)∼σ [ui(a, b)] .
We say that the game value V = (V1,V2) is a Lipschitz function of the payoff matrices u = (u1, u2)
if there exists a universal constant C such that
max
i∈{1,2}
∣∣Vi(u1, u2)−Vi(u′1, u′2)∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
‖V(u)−V(u′)‖∞
≤ C · max
j∈{1,2}
max
a,b∈A
∣∣∣uj(a, b)− u′j(a, b)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
‖u−u′‖∞
, ∀u, u′.
The following example shows that V is in general not Lipschitz in u.6
Lemma 19. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a pair of games u and u′, each with a unique CCE, such that
‖u− u′‖ ≤ 2ǫ and ‖V(u)−V(u′)‖∞ ≥ 1.
Proof. Consider two games u and u′ with payoff matrices
(u1, u2) =
(
1+ ǫ,−1− ǫ ǫ,−1
1,−ǫ 0, 0
)
and (u′1, u
′
2) =
(
1− ǫ,−1+ ǫ −ǫ,−1
1, ǫ 0, 0
)
,
where ǫ > 0. Note that the two pairs of payoff matrices satisfy ‖u− u′‖∞ = 2ǫ, so u and u′ can be
made arbitrarily close. The game u has a unique CCE, which is the deterministic policy (or pure
strategy) corresponding to the top-left entry of the payoff matrices; similarly, the game u′ has a
unique CCE corresponding to the bottom-right entry. These two CCEs have values
(V1(u1, u2),V2(u1, u2)) = (1+ ǫ,−1− ǫ) and
(
V1(u
′
1, u
′
2),V2(u
′
1, u
′
2)
)
= (0, 0),
which are bounded away from each other as claimed.
We note that in example above, the CCE policy of the game u is an ǫ-approximate CCE of the
game u′, and vice versa, as any unilateral deviation leads to at most ǫ improvement in the payoff.
6We learned the example from https://mathoverflow.net/questions/347366/
perturbation-of-the-value-of-a-general-sum-game-at-a-equilibirium
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